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Abstract 
How do changes in competitive intensity affect trade patterns? Models of collusive 
arrangements in spatially separated markets generate testable predictions of the effects of 
collusion on price, trade patterns and concentration.  We exploit a quasi-natural experiment 
associated with increased anti-trust enforcement activity over the last two decades to test these 
predictions.  In particular, we analyze detailed trade data linked to descriptive information 
from seven international cartels which collapsed as a consequence of increased antitrust 
enforcement activity.  Because antitrust activity is highly unlikely to affect spatial patterns of 
demand and supply (other than through its effect on the competitive environment), 
enforcement induced changes that are ideally suited to study the effect of competition on trade 
patterns.   We confirm significant declines in prices following the breakup of these seven cartels. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, and consistent with the more recent market-sharing 
oligopoly trade models, we find no significant change in spatial patterns of trade following 
cartel breakup; in particular, there is no significant change in the effect of distance on trade. 
Neither do we find evidence of significant changes in concentration or rearrangement of market 
shares.  These results imply that cross-hauling is not uncommon under collusion, and hence 
that the existence of cross-hauling by itself does not provide evidence of the existence of 
effective competition. 
JEL Codes: F12, F23, D43, D21 
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We exploit a recent change in antitrust enforcement to examine the impact of 
competition on trade.  The increased willingness of antitrust authorities, particularly in Europe 
and the United States, to prosecute international cartels has led to the detection and collapse of 
a large number of such cartels in recent years.1  In this paper, we analyze data on seven 
international cartels that collapsed as a result of intervention by antitrust authorities.  A key 
challenge for empirical analysis in industrial organization is finding suitably “exogenous” 
changes in competitive intensity.  Because antitrust action is unlikely to directly affect the 
patterns of production or consumption of the cartelized products, the changes triggered by 
antitrust activity provide the type of exogenous shifts in competition ideal for testing the 
predictions of oligopoly models of trade. 2 
Brander and Krugman’s (1983)  seminal work demonstrates that Cournot duopolists 
may engage in intra-industry trade in homogeneous goods, as it is in each duopolist’s self-
interest to maintain prices so high that it attracts entry into its home market by a foreign rival.  
Pinto (1986) and Fung (1991) extend this model to a repeated game environment where 
collusion is possible.  They show that a collusive Nash equilibrium is characterized by 
geographic specialization, enforced by a threat of Cournot reversion to the Brander-Krugman 
equilibrium.  In contrast, Baake and Normann (2002), and Bond and Syropoulos (2008), show 
that colluding firms may prefer an arrangement where both firms participate in both 
geographic markets (market sharing) in the collusive phase rather than specialize 
geographically.  In this model the benefit to defection is lower, and therefore the cartel is more 
stable with market sharing than in the equilibrium with geographic specialization.  
Following the collapse of a cartel, the Pinto/Fung models imply a significant change in 
trade patterns from geographic specialization to invasion of rivals’ markets.  The end of a cartel 
will be associated with a decline in the effect of distance on trade.  There will also be a 
significant decline in concentration as formerly forbearing cartel members enter one another’s 
                                                     
1  See Evenett, Levenstein and Suslow (2001) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) for an overview of 
international cartel prosecutions.  Hummels, Lugovskyy and Skiba (2007) examine the effect of shipping 
cartels on trade; Asker (2010) studies effects of collapse of the Parcel Tanker Shipping cartel on shipping 
patterns.   
2 Following a similar approach, Symeonidis (e.g. 2007, 2008) exploits changes in antitrust policy in the UK 
as a source of exogenous variation in competition, to examine the effect of competition on productivity, 
innovation, concentration and profitability.  
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markets.  On the other hand, the “market sharing” Baake-Normann/Bond-Syropoulos models 
imply little to no effect from cartel collapse on trade patterns or concentration as cross-hauling 
is observed both before and after cartel breakup.  (See Table 1 for a summary of predictions of 
these models.) 
To test the contrasting predictions of these models, we examine changes in trade 
patterns in products affected by seven commodity chemical cartels (listed in Table 2).  In each 
case, the cartel includes six or fewer member firms, predominantly from the United States and 
Western Europe.  Our selection of these cartels is based on three criteria.  First, the cartel must 
have collapsed because of antitrust intervention.  Second, there must be a close match between 
the product affected by collusive behavior and the trade data.  Third, we must have a reliable 
measure of the date of cartel breakup. 
In order to assure that these cartels were indeed sufficiently effective to have affected 
trade patterns, we first verify that they were successful in raising prices.  Both market sharing 
and geographic specialization models imply higher prices under collusion.  If observed prices 
were not higher during the cartel period, we would infer that the cartel was ineffective and 
would expect no measurable change in trade patterns following its collapse.   We find 
significant declines in prices following the breakup of each of the cartels selected for analysis 
(see Figure 1).3 
The primary contribution of this paper is to examine the effect of cartel breakup on 
estimates of the gravity equation.4  While we are motivated by the contrasting implications of 
                                                     
3 As illustrated in Figure 1, prices decline between 10.3 and 55.1 per cent (0.108 log points to 0.800 log 
points) within 2 years after cartel breakup, relative to one year before cartel breakup. Vitamin A’s price 
pattern appears to differ from the others as price begins to decline prior to cartel breakup (in 1999).  This 
reflects intervention by FBI agents in March 1997.  Connor (2007) reports “In response the cartels reduced 
the frequency of their meetings.  The last tripartite meeting of the vitamins A and E cartel took place in 
Basel in November 1997.  Thereafter, the conspirators would meet only bilaterally….On December 22, 
1997 Rhone-Poulenc announced to the other members of the cartels that it had decided to quit the 
conspiracy.  This announcement was a sham as the company continued to meet with Roche and BASF for 
another year.” (p. 286).  For a more general discussion of the effect of cartels on prices, see Levenstein and 
Suslow (2006) and Connor & Bolotova (2006).   
4 Other papers have examined the effect of particular factors on the distance coefficient (e.g. Freund and 
Weinhold (2004) on the effect of the internet).  In related work, researchers have examined changes in the 
coefficient on distance over time (e.g. Berthelon and Freund 2008).  Another influential literature uses the 
gravity equation to examine border effects (e.g. McCallum 1995, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003).  





the two sets of models for the effect of distance on trade, our focus on the gravity equation 
follows a rich tradition in the literature; notable examples include Rose (2000) for the effects of 
currency unions and Rose (2004) for the effect of WTO on trade.  In our baseline specification, 
we use the selection and heterogeneity corrected specification recently proposed by Helpman, 
Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).  In general, our results are consistent with market sharing models 
of collusion in that we find no significant change in the coefficient on distance in our gravity 
estimates.   
We also test for changes in concentration following cartel breakup.  We consider several 
measures of concentration, including the number of countries from which a country imports 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of importers in a national market.  Again, 
consistent with market sharing models, we find little evidence for significant changes in 
concentration.  Thus the decline in concentration predicted by geographic specialization models 
is not evident in the data for these cartels. 
These results survive numerous robustness tests. The estimated price declines associated 
with cartel breakup remain when controlling for changes in transport costs and the identity of 
countries in the sample.  We control for other contemporaneous changes affecting other 
products which are not known to have cartels.  In particular, we find no systematic evidence for 
difference-in-difference changes in the gravity distance coefficient or concentration between 
cartelized and non-cartelized products.  The gravity equation results are robust to using 
bilateral trade-pair fixed effects (as advocated by Cheng and Wall 2005), to using the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyo (2006), to using 
measures of export and import market shares as dependent variables, and to using alternative 
sub-samples of the data.  The concentration results are robust to using alternative measures of 
concentration, to using measures of market share instability (Caves and Porter 1978), and to 
using alternative sub-samples of the data.  Finally, we examine a potential alternative 
explanation of our results -- the Bertrand competition model proposed by Gross and Holahan 
(2003).  Both before and after cartels collapse, we find significant evidence for cross-hauling.  
We also find that levels of market concentration do not vary systematically with distance from a 
cartel country. This suggests that trade patterns for these products were more consistent with 




2. Theoretical motivation 
Alternative models of trade in imperfectly competitive markets differ in their 
predictions of the relationship between collusion and geographic specialization.  Brander and 
Krugman (1983) show that in a one-shot static game, duopolists engage in “reciprocal 
dumping,” resulting in trade in identical goods (intra-industry trade).5  Pinto (1986) extends 
their model to a repeated game setting, showing that under fairly general conditions a repeated 
game collusive equilibrium exists in which there is no trade: each firm stays focused on its 
home (or nearby) markets.  Fung (1991) obtains a similar “no-trade” result under collusion in 
the case of non-differentiated products.  In Fung’s model, trade arises under collusion only in 
the case of differentiated goods. 
These early extensions of Brander and Krugman suggest that we should observe 
“geographic specialization” under a collusive equilibrium and a shift to “market sharing” after 
cartel collapse.  This has stark implications for country-level import concentration measures: 
markets are expected to be highly concentrated in the collusive regime.  Concentration will fall 
as rivals invade each others’ territories in the non-collusive regime.  The key intuition is that 
with positive transportation costs, the cartel optimizes on costs by assigning markets to firms 
that are geographically proximate. The negative effect of distance on trade should therefore be 
stronger during collusion relative to the non-collusive period.   
The Pinto and Fung models imply that intra-industry trade in a homogeneous good is 
evidence of competition, as intra-industry trade does not occur in these models under collusion.  
More recently, Baake and Normann (2002) and Bond and Syropoulos (2008) have argued that 
there are strong incentives for firms to deviate in the “no trade” collusive equilibrium.  They 
show that if firms are not sufficiently patient, the joint-profit maximizing “geographic 
specialization” equilibrium cannot be sustained.  However, there exists a cooperative 
equilibrium with “market sharing” that yields profits higher than the static Brander-Krugman  
Cournot equilibrium.  While collusive profits in the market-sharing equilibrium are lower than 
under geographic specialization, the defection profits are reduced by even more.  Thus, by 
agreeing to share markets rather than specialize exclusively in home and nearby markets, firms 
reduce the incentive to deviate and can sustain collusion.  A switch from a collusive equilibrium 
to a competitive one will not necessarily reduce concentration significantly; cartel members may 
                                                     
5 The Brander-Krugman model in turn drew upon Smithies’s (1942) model of basing-point pricing.  
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agree to share multiple markets and then, after the cartel breakup, compete in those same 
markets (i.e., in a Brander and Krugman equilibrium).   The lack of geographic specialization 
under collusion implies that there is little effect of the breakup on the relationship between 
distance and trade. 
In the next section we present a formal symmetric, two-country model based on Bond 
and Syropoulos (2008), and show how the results are likely to be applicable in more general 
multi-country contexts. 
2.1. A repeated-game oligopoly trade model 
Consider a symmetric two-country, Cournot model of trade.  We refer to the two 
countries, i   and j, as “home” and “foreign,” with (symmetric) demand in each country given 
by a linear demand function  , where iQ represents the total quantity sold in country 
i.  Assume constant marginal cost for each firm, normalized to zero without loss of generality.  
Trade cost per unit exported is t (which can be thought of as transport costs, or more generally 
transportation costs plus tariffs). Let iq represent the quantity sold by the firm in country i in its 
home market and ix represent the quantity it exports.  The total quantity sold in country i is 
, and the total quantity sold by firm i is  .  The aggregate profit of firm i is 
the sum of profits earned in its home and export markets:  
{ }[ ( )] [ ( ) ]i i i j i j i iA q x q A q x t x= − + +Π −− +     
As in Brander and Krugman, the one-shot non-cooperative game yields a “reciprocal 
dumping” equilibrium. (As the firms/countries are symmetric, we drop the i/j subscript for 




), the symmetric 
non-collusive Nash equilibrium strategies (q, x)  are q = (A+t)/3 and x = (A-2t)/3.  This yields 
non-collusive profit, ΠN: 
2 222
9
5N At tAΠ − +=
                                                                   
(1)  
Turning to the repeated game, profit in the collusive equilibrium, ΠE is: 
{ }[ ( )]( )E A x x xq tq= − + +Π −       (2)  
If a firm deviates from the collusive agreement, the payoff from deviation is: 
7 
 
{ }2 2( ) ( )14
D A x A q tΠ − −+= −
   
(3)  
Note that deviation profits are strictly convex in (q, x) for all admissible output pairs. 
The maximum collusive profit that can be sustained must satisfy the non-deviation 
constraint.  Assuming the punishment phase is reversion to the non-collusive Nash equilibrium 
above, an agreement (q, x) is sustainable iff:  
) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ) ( ) 0 (4)( , , , E D NZ q q x t q xx tt tδ δ δ= Π − − Π − Π ≥  
where δ is the discount factor. 
Figure 2 depicts change in the collusive equilibria with variation in transport costs and 
the discount rate.  As in Pinto/Fung, when the discount factor is above a threshold (δ δ> , i.e., 
the players are sufficiently patient) firms can sustain a collusive equilibrium with maximal 
geographic specialization.6  Bond and Syropoulos (2008) show that the geographic 
specialization equilibrium obtains when transportation costs are above a certain threshold, 
corresponding to Region A in Figure 2. 7  Note that the output level in each market ( * / 2q A= ) 
is identical to the monopoly outcome. When the discount factor and transport costs are below 
these thresholds, the sustainable collusive outcome involves market sharing. 8   An equilibrium 
involving cross-hauling yields the same collusive profits, but is less susceptible to deviation 
than one involving maximal geographic specialization.  Thus, even in a range of discount 
factors where maximal geographic specialization is not sustainable in the Pinto (1986) model, a 
collusive equilibrium with market-sharing can be sustained.  
The optimality of market-sharing is driven by the convexity of the deviation profits in 
Equation (2).  Intuitively, consider region E where transport costs are zero and the discount 
factor is above the threshold 0 .  When firms share output equally in each market, the 
deviation profits ( 2( / 4, / 4,0) 9 / 32D A A AΠ = ) are lower than the deviation profits with 
maximal geographic specialization ( 2( / 2,0,0) 10 / 32D A AΠ = ), due to the strict convexity of 
the deviation payoffs.  Thus there is less incentive to deviate and higher collusive profits can be 
                                                     
6 See Bond and Syropoulos (2008) for proof. They also generalize the results to the case of multiple firms 
in a country and consider the impact on welfare of changes in tariffs and transportation costs. 
7 In Region F, the discount factor is sufficiently high to maintain monopoly profits (and output level, 
A/2), so that with zero transport costs the oligopoly solution is a correspondence, with   and 





maintained.  The same intuition applies in regions C and D, except that in these regions the 
combination of low transport costs and discount factors means that the cartel is forced to set 
output levels above the monopoly level (i.e.,  ) in order to sustain collusion.  
This model can be extended in a straightforward way to the case of a symmetric three-
country oligopoly.  Each firm sells output q in the home market and output x in each of the 





symmetric non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is: 
(i) output levels: q=(A+2t)/4 and x=(A-2t)/4 
(ii) aggregate profit:  Π    
The profit of each firm under a symmetric collusive equilibrium agreement (q, x) is: 
{ }[ ( 2 )]( 2 ) 2E A q x q x txΠ = −− + +      5  
If a firm deviates from an agreement (q, x, x), the payoff from deviation is: 
{ }2 2( 2 ) (14 )
D A x A q t+= − − −Π
   
  6  
Here too we get deviation profits that are strictly convex in (q, x) for all admissible output 
combinations. As before, assuming the game in the punishment phase is the non-collusive Nash 
equilibrium, a collusive agreement (q, x, x) is sustainable iff:  
) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ) ( ) 0 (7)( , , , DE NZ q q x t q xt tx tδ δ δ= Π − − Π − Π ≥  
where δ is the discount factor. 
The key results of the baseline model extend to the multi-country context.  In particular, 
for sufficiently low transport costs and discount factors, market sharing will be the only 
sustainable collusive equilibrium (while maximal geographic specialization may still be the 
optimal collusive outcome with sufficiently high discount or transport costs). As long as 
transport costs are high enough to rule out entry into non-adjacent markets, the structure of the 
problem for each firm is exactly the same as in the symmetric three-country case as discussed 
above, and therefore the key predictions of the Bond-Syroupolos and Baake-Normann models 
hold.9  






To summarize, in the empirical analysis we investigate the following broad theoretical 
predictions: (a) an earlier generation of geographic specialization models predicts that exporters 
serve geographically proximate markets under collusion and invade distant markets in the non-
collusive phase; and (b) a later generation of geographic specialization models predict that 
exporters  may sell to distant markets under market sharing arrangements in the collusive 
phase, and therefore the shift to non-collusive competition may not result in significant changes 
in the extent of cross-hauling and accordingly not affect trade patterns significantly.  
3. Cartel and trade data  
Until the early 1990s, international price-fixing conspiracies were considered outside the 
legal jurisdiction of most competition authorities.  Following the Archer Daniels Midland lysine 
scandal, both the United States and the European Commission began actively prosecuting 
international cartels, using amnesty policies to encourage cartel members to report collusive 
activities to the authorities (Levenstein and Suslow 2011).  This has led to a rash of prosecutions, 
which we use as the basis for the data in this paper.10 
We collect data on cartel membership, start and end dates, and detailed product 
descriptions for individual cartels, and then use the product descriptions to link cartel-specific 
information to import and export data.  To test the hypotheses above regarding the impact of a 
shift from collusion to competition, we examine seven international cartels that ended as a 
result of antitrust intervention (Table 2).  Even though the presence of a cartel is endogenous, 
the shift from collusion to competition was a result of a policy change driven by exogenous 
events.  Most of the cartel members in this sample were large, multinational, multiproduct 
firms.  In most cases, cartels included members from Europe, North America, and Asia, and 
















cartel agreements covered global markets.  These agreements targeted chemicals and food 
additives.  As relatively homogenous goods, they are appropriate for testing the models 
discussed above. 
These seven cartels were also selected because their products are a close match to the 
level of aggregation in the trade data in the UN Comtrade database.11  These data are bilateral 
(i.e., reported for country pairs), annual, and disaggregated by product.  The most detailed 
reliable data are disaggregated at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level (see Table 2 for 
specific HS codes).  We select cartels whose product unambiguously matches the HS 
classification.12  For example, the detailed description for HS 291814 is “Citric Acid,” 
corresponding exactly to the cartel’s targeted product. Although over one hundred 
international cartels have been prosecuted in the last two decades, for the vast majority there is 
not a clean match to the trade data.  For example, the “gas insulated switchgear” cartel affected 
products under HS 853530 “Isolating Switches and Make-and-break Switches, Voltage 
Exceeding 1000v.”  But it did not affect the large number of non-gas insulated products whose 
trade is also reported in this category.13 
Following the practice in the trade literature, we use data on reported imports.  Ideally, 
properly aggregated export and import data equal one another (except for insurance and 
freight) and hence can provide data validation.  In fact, exports are tracked less carefully.  Most 
countries charge duties on imports but not exports, so export data are much sparser than import 
data.  For example, France reports methionine imports for most years, but reports exports for 
only one year.  France is a large methionine exporter, but those exports are missing in the 
COMTRADE data. Therefore, we analyze import data and use reported imports to infer 
exports.14 
We generally observe that the number of reporting countries in the COMTRADE 
database increases over time.  This may reflect genuine increases in trade; it may also reflect 
improvement in data collection, either by the UN or by reporting countries.  There are also 
                                                     
11 Available at http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.  
12 Commodity descriptions from the "Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System" (World 
Customs Organization) are available from several trade-related websites (e.g.,  http://www.foreign-
trade.com/reference/hscode.cfm). 
13 Vitamin B1, B2 and C also have close matches in the HS classification; however the predominant cause 
of the breakup for these cartels was competition from a growing fringe.  Because we want to focus here 
on competition changes “exogenous” to or uncorrelated with production patterns, we excluded these 
cartels from our analysis.  They were included in preliminary analyses and the results were qualitatively 
similar to those reported below.  Given the endogeneity issues, they were not included in the final study. 
14 This is consistent with the approach taken by Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma and Mo (2005) in creating the 
NBER World Trade Flows database (1962-2000).   
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many countries that report very little trade.  Given this dispersion in the size of trade flows, 
small outlier countries could have a large impact on the analysis if they are given as much 
weight as larger countries.  Hence throughout the analysis, we weight observations by trade 
quantity.15 
Finally, we select these seven cartels because the data reflect a significant change in the 
price of the product at the time of the cartel’s demise.  For each cartel, we use a nine year panel 
covering four years before and four years after the cartel breakup.  We treat the four year period 
prior to breakup as “the collusive period.” In some cases, the cartel formed earlier, but these 
four years are most comparable in all other respects to the four years after cartel breakup.  We 
exclude the reported breakup year in most specifications because the year of the reported 
breakup may include both periods of collusion and non-collusion.   
We define price as the ratio of trade value to trade quantity for each specific product.  
We calculate the average price for each product, for each year, for each bilateral trade pair. 16   
Table 3 shows pre and post break up summary statistics for price and concentration for each 
cartel.   Comparing the average price from the cartel period to the average price after cartel 
breakup, we find a significant decline in mean log price. These declines vary from about 7.32% 
(0.076 log points) in the case of Citric Acid to decline of 58.02% (0.868 log points) for Vitamin 
E.17   As discussed above, this indicates that, for these products, there was a real change in the 
intensity of competition at the time of the observed cartel dissolution. 18 
                                                     
15 When the dependent variable of interest is the price level, it is appealing to use trade quantity as the 
weighting variable.  For example, suppose the bulk of country A’s imports is 10,000 kg from country X at 
a value of $30,000.  Suppose for some special reason, country A imports a small quantity of 50 kg from 
country Y at a value of $1000.  Then the un-weighted mean price of imports into country A is (3+20)/2= 
$11.5/kg.  The trade-weighted mean price is (10,000*3 +50*20)/10050= $3.08/kg, and hence is a much 
more appropriate reflection of the price faced by consumers in country A.  In regressions of log price or 
other variables such as market share, it is less obvious that trade quantity is the appropriate weight.  We 
test robustness using trade value weights and find results are generally very similar. 
16 Note  that  the  price  variable  is  defined  for  each  trade  observation,  and  accordingly  the  number  of 
observations equals  the number of  importer‐exporter‐years  in  the data.   Some small countries or small 
transactions  report  values  or  quantities  that  are  extreme  outliers,  leading  to  improbably  high  or  low 
estimates of price.  To minimize such distortions, we truncate observations where the implied price is in 
the  tail  of  the distribution  (2%  on  either  side). That is, where the implied price lies in the tail of the 
distribution (2.0% on either tail), we treat the observation as missing.   
17 A decline of 0.076 log points means log(Ppost) - log(Ppre)= - 0.076, which translates to a percentage 
decline in price (defined as [(Ppost - Ppre)/ Ppre)] equal to ( 0.076) 1e − − = - 7.318 percent. 
18 There were other international cartels that ended during this time period for which we found a close 
match to the HS categorization, but for which prices do not significantly decline at the time of the 
reported cartel breakup.  These include Aluminum Fluoride, Sodium Chlorate, and Hydrogen Peroxide 
12 
 
We define import concentration as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of annual 
import market shares of each product into a country (Table 3).  This is defined as the sum of the 












where Sijkt is the market share of exporter country i in the total value of imports of product k 
entering importer country j in period t, and Njkt is the number of countries exporting product k 
to importer country j in period t.   We are interested in measuring the number of competitors in 
each market.  Our proxy is the number of trade partners, Njkt (Table 3).  Note that the 
concentration measures are defined by importer country for each year, and hence the number of 
observations equals the number of importer-years.19  Mean HHI for these markets ranges from 
2760 to 4290 (Table 3).20  The U.S. Department of Justice’s merger guidelines set an HHI of 2500 
as the threshold for “highly concentrated” markets.21  Not surprisingly, these are highly 
concentrated industries. 
For each of these products, the mean number of trade partners (between nine and 
fifteen) is larger than the number of members of the cartel (between three and five).  This 
difference reflects, in part, the presence of a few small fringe producers.  More importantly, 
most cartel members manufacture and export from more than one country.  Thus reported 
measures of import concentration are lower than what would be calculated based on firm 
market shares, as a single firm may export into a market from multiple countries.  On the other 
hand, import concentration ignores domestic production and therefore overstates concentration.  
As our analysis will examine the change in concentration, our measure should be able to capture 
any impact of a change in competitive intensity on concentration.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
and Perborates.  This may reflect an ineffective cartel or a misreporting of the date of the cartel’s demise.  
In either case, this suggests that trade data for these cartels are not appropriate for testing the models 
discussed above. 
19 More detailed definitions of the variables used in the analysis are given in the Data Appendix. 
20 Note that HHI in Table 3 are expressed on a zero to one scale.  In most policy documents, including the 
U.S. Department of Justice merger guidelines, HHI is expressed on a zero to 10,000 scale. 




4. Empirical specifications and baseline results 
4.1. Price results 
To begin our empirical analysis we examine the robustness of the price changes 
described above to controls for other determinants of trade between specific country pairs.  We 
also distinguish the long and short run impacts of cartel breakup on price.  For example, if price 
adjusts slowly in response to a change in competitive intensity, it may be that the immediate 
impact will be small, but will grow over time.  It is also possible that the breakup causes intense 
competition in its immediate aftermath, but that, over time, tacit collusion re-emerges in these 
highly concentrated industries.22   
In order to estimate the short-run and long-run changes in log price following the cartel 
breakup (relative to the mean collusive price level), we specify the following:  
0ijt SPOST SPOST LPOST LPOST ij ijtD Dp fα α α= + + ++ ε      (8a) 
where pijt denotes price (or log price), DSPOST is a dummy for the short-run post-breakup period 
(defined as years 1 and 2 after the cartel breakup), DLPOST is a dummy for the long-run post-
breakup period (defined as years 3 and 4 after the cartel breakup), denotes importer-exporter 
pair fixed effects and denotes the error term.23  (The subscript i denotes exporting country, j 
denotes importing country and t denotes year.)  As discussed above, because the cartel could 
have broken up at any time during the year, we exclude data for the breakup year from this 
analysis. The coefficient SPOSTα reflects the difference in mean price between the short-run post-
breakup period (years t+1 and t+2) and the collusive period. Similarly LPOSTα  reflects the 
difference in mean price between the long-run post-breakup period (years t+3 and t+4) and the 
collusive period. 
                                                     
22 See Alexander (1994) for a discussion of how an episode of explicit cooperation facilitates future tacit 
collusion. 
23 One significant advantage of using trade panel data is that we can control for a number of country-
specific and bilateral factors in these price regressions using importer or importer-exporter fixed effects.  
For example, Hummels and Skiba (2004) show that bilateral distance and the income level of the source 
or destination country generally has an impact on price.  Since we are focusing on homogenous, narrowly 
defined products, this concern may not be serious; nevertheless, inclusion of importer-exporter pair fixed 
effects controls for these factors so that we do not confound price changes due to changes in competition 
with price changes resulting from other factors.  To allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals across 






We find significant decline in price for all of these cartels, both in the short and long run 
(Table 4).24   The short run declines in price vary from 0.045 log points (4.40%) for Citric Acid to 
as high as 0.797 log points (54.93%) for Vitamin E.   The long run declines are generally larger, 
ranging from 0.142 log points (13.24%) for Citric Acid to 0.915 log points (59.95%) for Vitamin E.   
This implies that the short-run price-declines were not simply the result of a temporary price 
war following breakup and that antitrust intervention, at least for these seven cartels, had a 
sustained impact on market outcomes. 
We also consider the possibility that a cartel had become less effective immediately prior 
to its breakup, and that the changes documented in Table 4 reflect a prior trend of price decline.  
To test this, we estimate the following specification:  
ijt SPRE SPRE SPOST SPOST LPOST LPOST ij ijtDp fD Dα α α= + + + + ε    (8b) 
where all terms are defined as above, and DSPRE is a dummy for the short-run pre-breakup 
period defined as equal to 1 during the two years immediately prior to the cartel breakup. With 
the inclusion of DSPRE, all the coefficients capture differences in means relative to the long-run 
pre-breakup period (years t-4 and t-3).  While in some cases there was a statistically significant 
decline prior to cartel breakup (column 1 of Table 5), in all cases prices fall even more after 
breakup (i.e., SPOST SPREα α− , column 2 of Table 5, is negative). For a full set of results from 
specification (8b), see Appendix Table A.7; also, Figure 1 and Appendix Figure A.1 confirms 
that sharp declines in price occur around the time of breakup of the cartels. 
4.2. Impact on trade patterns 
Having established that these seven markets underwent a demonstrable change in 
competitive intensity, we now examine the effect of this change on trade patterns.  As discussed 
in Section 2, the geographic specialization models predict a sharp decline in the effect of 
distance on trade following cartel collapse.  In these models, firms focus on their home and 
nearby markets under collusion, but venture further into competitors’ territories under the non-
collusive regime. 25   In contrast, the market sharing models predict less rearrangement, as there 
can be market sharing even under the collusive regime. 
                                                     
24 We obtain similar results using price levels rather than log prices. 
25 The models are framed in the context of a “home” market and a foreign “market.”  In the context of our 
trade data where we are looking at export patterns, the “home country” can be thought of as a proxy for 
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We first let the data speak for itself, calculating the distance travelled by each cartelized 







δ =∑∑   
where ikt ijkt
j
rR = ∑ , ijktr is the value of imports of product k into importer country i from exporter 
country j, and  is the distance between country i and country j.  For example, δCitric Acid, t  = 
average number of miles traveled by one dollar’s worth of citric acid imports.  Figure 3 shows 
the variation over time in distance travelled for each product.  While the graphical presentation 
of δk,t suggests an increase in distance travelled, there is no statistically significant break in trend 
around the collapse of most of the cartels (unlike the stark breaks that occurred in price).   
To examine trade patterns more systematically, we estimate a “gravity equation” 
following the specification of Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008, hereafter HMR):  
 ijt d ij SPRE SPRE ij SPOST SPOST ij LPOST LPOST ij ijt i j t ijtd D d D d D dm fX f fα α α α β= + + + + + +++ ε  (9a) 
where ijtm  is the log of the value of imports from country i into country j in year t, dij is the log 
of the bilateral distance,26 DSPPRE, DSPOST and DLPOST are defined as above, Xijt is a vector of 
bilateral controls, fi and fj denote importer and exporter fixed effects, ft denotes year effects and 
ijtε is the residual error term.27 
To address the issue of zero-trade observations, we adopt the methodology proposed by 
HMR which requires estimating a first stage equation for the selection of trade partners.  
Following HMR, we use the following selection equation:  
observed variable( 1| )s (
)
ijt d ij SPRE SPRE ij SPOST SPOST ij
LPOST LPOST ij ijt i j t










     (9b) 
where Dijt is a dummy indicating non-zero exports from exporter j to importer i in year t, Φ (.) is 
the cdf of the unit normal distribution, and Hijt is a set of control variables (see Data Appendix 
                                                                                                                                                                           
“geographically proximate markets” for the first (i.e. “home”) firm, and the “foreign country” is the set of 
markets that are geographically proximate to the other (i.e. “foreign”) firm.   
26 We define bilateral distance as the log bilateral population weighted distance (in km).  See Data 
Appendix for detailed definitions of all variables. 
27 Following Cheng and Wall (2005), we check the robustness of our results to using bilateral trade-pair 




for details).28  We allow the coefficient on distance in this propensity equation to vary by 
competitive regime, as we are interested in any change in the impact of distance on the 
probability of trade.   In particular, if the change in competitive intensity induces a switch from 
geographic specialization to reciprocal dumping, we should see a weakening in the impact of 
distance on the trading partner selection, i.e. the magnitude of the negative coefficient on 
distance should be smaller in the post-breakup regime. 
The HMR methodology modifies the specification in equation (9a) to include two terms  
to address bias from sample selection and unobserved firm heterogeneity, respectively: 
* * *ˆ ˆˆ( )ln{exp[ ] 1}ijt ijt u ijtz ηδ η β η− ++ , where 
* * *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) / ( )ij ij ijz zη φ= Φ , 
* 1 ˆˆ ( )ij ijz ρ
−= Φ , and 
( 1| )ijt ijt ijtP D Wρ = = .   To control for the first term flexibly, we follow one of the approaches 
suggested by HMR and include a third degree polynomial in *îjz .  Thus we obtain the following 





ˆ ˆ( ) +
ijt d ij SPRE SPRE ij SPOST SPOST ij LPOST LPOST ij
k





d D d D d D d
fX f z




= + + +
+ + + + +∑ ε
     (9c) 
Estimating the distance coefficient interactions for the propensity specification (9b), we 
find little or no change in the effect of distance on the probability of trade, providing support for 
market sharing models of collusive behavior (Table 6).   Columns 1a and 2a compare the short-
run post-breakup period (t+1 and t+2) to the 2-year (t-2 and t-1) and 4-year (t-4 to t-1) pre-
breakup periods respectively, while columns 1b and 2b compare the long-run post-breakup 
period (t+3 and t+4) to the 2-year and 4-year pre-breakup periods.  For most of the cartels we 
find no significant changes in the coefficient on distance.   Thus, the probit regressions provide 
no support for the geographic specialization models and are largely consistent with market 
sharing models.   
Our HMR-corrected gravity estimates are also generally consistent with market sharing 
models (Table 7).  We find no statistically significant changes in the distance coefficient for most 
                                                     
28 Because specification (9b) does not include trade-pair fixed effects, the set of variables in Hijt includes 
bilateral variables that are fixed over time (such as a non-interacted distance term).   
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of the cartels either relative to the 4-year pre-breakup period (columns 1a and 1b) or relative to 
the short-run 2-year pre-breakup period (columns 2a and 2b).29   
These propensity and gravity specification results provide strong evidence that collusive 
trade patterns in these markets are more consistent with the market-sharing model than with 
geographic specialization.  Hence these results imply that international collusion cannot be 
ruled out by the observation of significant intra-product trade between countries, as pointed out 
by Baake and Normann (2002). Our results are robust to a number of robustness checks, 
discussed in Section 5 below.    
4.3. Concentration results 
We analyze two measures of concentration: import HHI and the number of trade 
partners.  Our descriptive statistics suggest little or no change in concentration for most of these 
cartels (Table 3).  The number of partners generally increases; this may, however, reflect overall 
increases in globalization.   
To isolate the impact of changes in competitive intensity on concentration, we examine 
regression specifications similar to those above, but with a measure of concentration (HHI or 
number of partners) as the dependent variable:30    
                                                     
29 In Column 2a of Table 7, in the short-run post breakup relative to the short-run pre-breakup period, 
there is a significant increase in the distance coefficient (consistent with the Pinto/Fung models) for Citric 
Acid and Vitamin E, but these effects are not significant in the long-run (Column 2b).  We also examine 
year-by-year changes around the breakup year in Figures 4 and 5. The specifications are the same as in 
equations (9b) and (9c) respectively, except that the distance variable is interacted with period dummies.  
The figures confirm the results in Table 6 and 7.  In particular, in Figure 5, the one cartel with a steady 
decline in the coefficients on distance is Citric Acid, but this appears to be the result of a pre-existing 
trend.   For none of the cartels do we observe a sharp increase in the coefficient on distance which we 
would expect if there were new entry into far-off rival markets as hypothesized in the market division 
models.  In Figure 5, consistent with the results in Table 7, we find little evidence of significant changes in 
the coefficient on distance. Vitamin E shows an increase one year after the breakup year, but this increase 
reverses in the subsequent years.  For two cartels – Citric Acid and Vitamin E – we find a significant 
strengthening of the negative effect of distance on the propensity to trade in the short run.  For Vitamin E, 
these effects disappear in the longer term (columns 1b and 2b).   For Citric Acid, the trend analysis 
(Figure 4) suggests that the significant negative effects result from a pre-existing trend, rather than a 
structural break induced by the cartel collapse.  One explanation  for the increase in the negative effect of 
distance in these cases could be that the higher prices maintained by the cartel in the collusive regime 
allowed some small fringe players  to operate in distant markets, which they were no longer able to do 
after the collapse of the cartel. 
30 One difference from the earlier estimates is that observations here are importer-year specific, and 
accordingly, the fixed effects we use are importer effects.  Also, to account for differing market sizes in 
different countries, regressions are weighted by import quantity.   
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it SPOST SPOST LPOST LPOST i itD DCONC fα α= + + + ε      (10a) 
it SPRE SPRE SPOST SPOST LPOST LPOST i itD D DCONC fα α α= + + + + ε     (10b) 
We find no statistically significant changes in HHI for most cartels (Table 8, columns 1a 
through 2b).  Neither is there a significant change in the number of partners for most of the 
cartels (Table 8, columns 3a through 4b).  These results are confirmed in Figure 6, which 
captures year-to year changes in HHI.   
Once again, these results are generally more consistent with market sharing models of 
collusion, than with geographic specialization models that would predict a dramatic change in 
concentration following cartel breakup.  These markets were highly concentrated prior to 
breakup.  The persistence of this high concentration may reflect ongoing customer relationships 
or other barriers to entry established under collusion.  This may reflect the nature of marketing 
costs and customer-supplier relationships in the products we study.  All the products we study 
here are intermediate goods, involving business-to-business marketing.   In many cases, both 
customers and producers are global firms.  Cartel market division schemes that assign 
customers to firms preserve the reputational capital and client relationships built up by cartel 
member firms before the formation of the cartel and effectively reduce the marketing and 
transaction costs with specific clients in particular markets. 31   These relationships are 
maintained during and after collusion.   
5. Robustness checks 
5.1. Controlling for contemporaneous shocks using a DID approach 
One potential concern with the baseline results is that the changes observed in price may 
be driven by contemporaneous shocks coincident with the cartel breakup.  Even the stability of 
the distance coefficient and concentration measures could reflect countervailing influences such 
that changes in the competitive environment are offset by other external shocks that were 
common across these products.   
The availability of panel data allows us to address this concern using a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach, comparing changes in the cartelized product to other comparable 
products with no known change in competitive intensity.   In particular, we examine two 
                                                     
31 Arkolakis (2009) emphasizes the role of marketing costs in trade. 
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related products: (i) enzymes (not including rennet, HS 350790), which includes a number of 
enzymes used as additives in animal feed; and (ii) organic chemicals (not elsewhere specified, 
HS  294200), a residual category within the broad group of organic chemicals to which all of our 
cartelized products belong.   The comparison to enzymes and other organic chemicals allows us 
to control (respectively) for exogenous changes in trading patterns affecting either animal 
additives or organic chemicals generally.  To our knowledge, neither of these product categories 
was cartelized (or more importantly, neither had a change in status from cartelized to non-
cartelized, or vice versa), and therefore serve as valid control groups. The DID analysis confirms 
our results (Table 9).  In particular, we find that even relative to the control products, the 
cartelized products in almost all cases show large (and in most cases statistically significant) 
declines in price.  We continue to we find no systematic patterns for change in concentration or 
in the coefficient on distance.32 
5.2. Other Robustness Checks 
We check our results using a number of additional robustness tests.  In each case, we 
find the results are consistent with those above.  The price decline results are robust to 
alternative specifications: (i) in order to eliminate the possibility that the results are driven by 
changes in transportation costs, we re-estimate the equations above using FOB prices; 33  (ii) in 
order to confirm the price effects indeed reflect behavior of cartel members, we reran our 
analysis using a sample of imports from countries where cartel members are headquartered 
(Appendix Table A.1).  
                                                     
32 The price coefficients are noisier, particularly relative to organic chemicals nes, which is not surprising 
as this control group is likely to have a number of different chemicals (but could still provide a good 
comparison group for concentration, as well as for trade patterns affecting all organic chemicals). While 
there are no significant DID changes in the concentration measures, there are some significant DID results 
for the distance coefficient, but they do not provide any systematic evidence in favor of the geographic 
specialization models.  Coefficients are positive and significant for two cartels relative to organic 
chemicals nes, negative in some cases and positive for couple of others relative to enzymes. 
33 If transportation (insurance and freight) costs for all of these products fell around the time of the cartel 
breakup, this could explain the observed fall in prices (as the reported import (c.i.f) prices we use include 
transportation costs).  To rule out this explanation, we examine data on reported export quantities and 
values, which are reported F.O.B (free on board), and hence do not include insurance and freight costs.  
As discussed earlier, a drawback of the data on exports is that it is much sparser (as a number of 
countries do not report exports for many or all of the years) and is generally viewed as being of poorer 
quality (Feenstra et al 2005).   Nevertheless, there are sufficient observations for most cartels to do a 
robustness check using the export data. The results, summarized in columns 1a and 1b of Appendix Table 
A.1, show significant price declines for FOB prices and confirm that the baseline results in Table 4 and 5 
are not driven by declines in transportation costs. 
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We find the gravity equation results robust to (i) using bilateral trade-pair fixed effects 
(as advocated by Cheng and Wall (2005, Appendix Table A.2, columns 1a and 1b);34 (ii) using 
the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyo 
(2006, Appendix Table A.2, columns 2a and 2b);35 and (iii) using measures of import and export 
market shares as dependent variables (Appendix Table A.2, columns 3a-3b and 4a-4b, 
respectively).36  We reproduced the results for the gravity regressions for three different 
subsamples: (i) restricted to Europe to abstract from markets far from most cartel headquarters 
(Appendix Table A.3, columns 2a and 2b);  (ii) a balanced panel to assure that our results are not 
driven by increases in trade data coverage over time (Table A.3, columns 3a and 3b); and (iii) 
restricting to imports from cartel headquarter countries to abstract from effects induced by non-
cartel (or other production location) exports (Appendix Table A.3, columns 4a and 4b).37   
Finally, we find the concentration results robust to using alternative measures of 
concentration (Appendix Table A.4, columns 1 and 2).38  We also examine measures of market 
share instability (Caves and Porter 1978) and find no significant increases in this measure either 
                                                     
34 In the baseline regressions in Section 4.2, we follow HMR (and Anderson and van Wincoop 2003) and 
use exporter and importer fixed effects separately.  In principle, it should be possible to apply the HMR 
methodology even with bilateral fixed effects.  However, data for the excluded variables they recommend 
– entry barriers and religion – are unavailable or invariant during the period in which we are interested.   
35 The PMML estimator addresses both zero-trade and bias from heteroscedasticity in the log linear 
model.  One motivation for our use of the Silva-Tenreyo estimator is that the HMR methodology 
presumes monopolistic competition, which may not be a valid representation of oligopolistic interaction 
between firms (either under collusion or competition) for the products we study.  Thus the PMML 
estimator addresses concerns about zero-trade observations without explicitly relying on any 
assumptions about the structure of competition.  To address concerns raised by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), we include exporter-importer fixed effects in the Silva-Tenreyo estimation.  
36 Under the geographic specialization model, we expect exporters to have higher shares in 
geographically proximate markets under collusion; thus, we should observe a weaker relationship 
between import market share (Sijkt defined as the market share of export country i in the total value of 
imports of product k entering country j) and bilateral distance after breakup.  For the same reason, if 
collusion involves geographic specialization, there should be a stronger negative relationship between 
export market share (Xijkt defined as the share of the exports going to country j in the total value of 
exports of product k by exporter country i) and bilateral distance under collusion. Again, overall the 
results suggest little change in the pattern of trade; the relationship between import and export market 
shares and bilateral distance is not significantly affected, either in the short run or long run for most 
cartels. Note that these regressions include the zero-trade observations, and therefore, following 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we include exporter-importer fixed effects.   
37 In unreported regressions, we also checked whether the gravity equation results are affected by the rise 
of Chinese exports by excluding Chinese imports.  Our results were robust to this check. 
38 We use the C4 ratio, defined as the sum of market shares of the top four importers in each market, as 
well as the HHI measure for export shares, defined for each exporter-year as the sum of the squared share 
of destination markets in total exports. 
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close to or after the cartel breakup (Appendix Table A.4, columns 3 and 4).39  We examine and 
find the concentration (HHI) results robust in four different subsamples (see Appendix Table 
A.5): (i) restricted to Europe to abstract from markets far from most cartel headquarters;  (ii) a 
balanced panel to assure that the results are not driven by increases in trade data coverage over 
time; (iii) excluding cartel home countries (as concentration figures here are likely 
disproportionately upwardly biased because  of unmeasured domestic output); and (iv) 
restricted to imports from cartel headquarter countries to abstract from effects induced by non-
cartel (or other production location) exports (Appendix Table A.3, columns 4a and 4b).40 
5.3. An alternative explanation: geographic specialization and Bertrand competition 
Our results are superficially consistent with models of geographic specialization during 
collusion, but in which competitive reversion takes the form of Bertrand competition.  In this 
case, there is no cross-hauling during collusion or during competition, so there is no change in 
trade patterns after the breakup of the cartel.  For example, Gross and Holahan (2003) show 
that, with positive transportation costs, Bertrand competition leads to geographic specialization.  
In this respect, their model is observationally equivalent to the market sharing models 
discussed above.   
In order to distinguish these two alternative interpretations of our empirical results, we 
look for evidence of cross-hauling.  We find that cartel home countries received imports, even 
from other cartel member home countries, during collusion.  In Table 10 (columns 1 and 2) we 
examine the magnitude of imports into cartel home countries.  We calculate imports as a 
fraction of total trade (imports plus exports).  Under geographic specialization, we would 
expect these countries to import very little relative to what they export.  We find that imports 
are instead a considerable fraction of trade, ranging from 18.3% for MCAA to 60% for Vitamin 
B3, during the collusive period (column 1a).  There is also evidence for significant cross-hauling 
in the post-breakup period (column 1b).  In column 2, we examine the share of imports into 
                                                     
39 Under the geographic specialization model, we expect to see a rearrangement of consumer-supplier 
relations, and hence a spike in the instability of market shares, at least in the short run after the cartel 
breakup.  On examining the year-to-year changes in the instability measures, we did not find evidence for 
this.  
40 For most cartels, there are no significant concentration changes in any of the subsamples; one exception 
is Vitamin E, for which we find some evidence for declines in concentration in most subsamples.  Also, in 




cartel home countries that come from other cartel member countries.   Our analysis finds 
significant cross-hauling, even from other cartel countries, both before and after the cartel 
breakup.  We find that other cartel home countries import large quantities from other cartel 
countries.  For example, 91% of imports of Vitamin B3 into cartel countries came from cartel 
countries.  This is more consistent with the Baake-Normann and Bond-Syropoulos Cournot 
models than the Gross-Holahan Bertrand model.   
As an additional test to distinguish between these two types of models, we examine 
geographic variation in import concentration.   If the Gross-Holahan model holds, we would 
expect to see a significantly higher concentration in markets adjacent to cartel home countries.  
We distinguish two samples: (i) countries bordering exactly one cartel home country; (ii) 
countries not bordering any cartel home country.  We find little evidence for higher 
concentration (as measured by mean HHI) in markets adjacent to cartel home countries (Table 
10, columns 3a-4c).  In fact, for most cartels, we find lower concentration in markets adjacent to 
cartel home countries.41  This, again, suggests that trade patterns are more consistent with the 
Cournot, market-sharing models than with the Gross-Holahan Bertrand model. 
6. Discussion of results and conclusions 
We examine the effect of changes in competitive intensity on trade patterns using data 
from seven international cartels prosecuted for explicit price fixing during the 1990s.  Cartel 
collapses triggered by increased anti-trust enforcement activity provide a quasi-natural 
experiment to study the effects of changes in competitive intensity on a number of interesting 
outcomes.  Each of the products of these cartels experienced striking declines in price levels 
after their collapse, strongly suggesting that there were indeed substantial and meaningful 
changes in the competitive environment. By focusing on cartel breakups caused by a change in 
policy and analyzing only trade in products where the data suggest the cartel was effective 
                                                     
41 These results could be affected by the fact that cartel firms have production facilities in countries other 
than their headquarters location.  This means that concentration measures may be high even in some 
markets non-adjacent to cartel home countries if they are reserved for the exports from non-home 
production locations of a cartel member.  Nevertheless, if the Gross-Holahan model holds, on average, we 
expect the HHI of markets adjacent to cartel members to be higher than that of all other countries (even if 
some of them may be adjacent to other cartel locations), as the firms price to drive out competitors from 
close-by markets.  Note that the results in Column 3c are also evidence against the Pinto/Fung models 
geographic specialization models, as these suggest no significant targeting of geographically proximate 
markets in the pre-cartel collapse period. 
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before breakup and not after, this analysis can distinguish the impact of changes in competitive 
intensity on trade patterns from other contemporaneous changes.    
We test models of collusive behavior in homogenous good markets with starkly 
different implications for the effect of cartel break-up on trade patterns and market 
concentration.  Consistent with the market sharing models proposed in Baake and Normann 
(2002) and Bond and Syropoulos (2008), and contrary to conventional wisdom captured in the 
geographic specialization models of Pinto (1986) and Fung (1991), we find no significant 
changes in trading patterns or import concentration following the collapse of the cartels.   Our 
results imply that cross-hauling is not uncommon under collusion, and hence that the existence 
of cross-hauling by itself does not provide evidence of the existence of effective competition.  To 
the contrary, in several recent international cartel cases, cartel members purchased from one 
another across international borders in order to achieve cartel market share targets.42   
Our finding of the lack of change in trading patterns is similar in spirit to the finding of 
little change in market conduct following the collapse of the parcel tanker cartel in Asker (2010).  
However, in the case of the cartels we examine, we do find significant declines in price, so there 
appears to have been an impact on conduct (in the form of pricing if not of trade patterns) 
consequent to these cartel breakups.  
In interpreting our results, one caveat to be borne in mind relates to the nature of the 
products we study.  All of the products we look at are chemicals with relatively low 
transportation costs.  As stressed by Bond and Syropoulos, the collusive outcome with market 
sharing is likely to be a Nash equilibrium outcome only if transport costs are sufficiently low.  
Thus, in the case of other products that have higher transportation costs, it is possible that the 
collusive outcome involves geographic specialization.  Accordingly, our evidence against the 
latter models should be viewed in the context of the nature of the products we examine.43 
                                                     
42 For example, the European Commission describes the policy of the Vitamin A cartels: "The information 
for the whole year was maintained on a cumulative monthly basis to ensure that each party kept to its 
agreed market share … If at the end of the year a producer was substantially ahead of its quota, it had to 
purchase vitamins from the others in order to compensate them for the corresponding shortfall in their 
allocation."  (European Commission 2003, par. 196).  Other cartels with similar arrangements include 
lysine, organic peroxide, MCAA, and citric acid.  
43 To further explore this issue, we did attempt to examine some cartelized products that potentially have 
higher transportation costs.  Products we examined closely included elevators, gas insulated switchgear 
and carbon cathode blocks. Unfortunately, we found a poor fit between these products and the closest HS 
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Empirical Prediction associated with 
Increasing Intensity of Competition 
Concentration Impact of distance on trade 
Brander & 




specialization Market sharing  Falls Decreases 








Market sharing Market sharing  No change (or slight decrease) 
No change (or 
slight decrease) 
Bond and 
Syropoulos (2008) Market sharing Market sharing  
No change (or 
slight decrease) 






Table 2: Cartel demographics 








Home country of member 
firms 
Citric Acid 291814 1991 1995 5 5 Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, US 




291540 1984 1999 16 4 Netherlands, France, Germany 
Vitamin A 293621 1989 1999 11 3 Germany, Switzerland, France 
Vitamin B3 




292310 1988 1998 11 6 Canada, US, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany 
Vitamin E 293628 1989 1999 11 4 Germany, Switzerland, Japan, France 




Table 3: Summary statistics: changes in price and concentration measures  




















Citric Acid       
N 2,029 3,793   232 458   232 458 
Mean 0.241 0.165 -0.076 0.294 0.276 -0.018 15.497 14.972 -0.524 
SD (p-value) 0.224 0.224 (0.000) 0.169 0.113 (0.380) 5.201 3.988 (0.616) 
Methionine       
N 1,933 2,374   338 428   338 428 
Mean 1.074 0.784 -0.290 0.411 0.352 -0.059 9.286 9.765 0.479 
SD (p-value) 0.227 0.193 (0.000) 0.171 0.141 (0.009) 3.239 3.242 (0.329) 
MCAA       
N 1,206 1,370   280 332   280 332 
Mean 0.097 -0.216 -0.313 0.446 0.447 0.001 9.062 9.167 0.106 
SD (p-value) 0.306 0.286 (0.000) 0.215 0.207 (0.981) 3.181 3.496 (0.883) 
Vitamin A       
N 1,974 2,553   327 422   327 422 
Mean 3.208 2.913 -0.295 0.417 0.371 -0.045 11.576 11.939 0.363 
SD (p-value) 0.850 0.639 (0.194) 0.210 0.166 (0.334) 3.850 3.670 (0.718) 
Vitamin B3       
N 1,700 2,176   271 336   271 336 
Mean 2.720 2.356 -0.364 0.415 0.364 -0.051 11.095 11.881 0.786 
SD (p-value) 0.354 0.383 (0.000) 0.191 0.159 (0.307) 3.163 2.617 (0.197) 
Vitamin B4       
N 1,725 2,042   296 376   296 376 
Mean -0.070 -0.304 -0.233 0.450 0.420 -0.029 10.246 10.303 0.057 
SD (p-value) 0.361 0.382 (0.000) 0.222 0.212 (0.531) 3.074 3.511 (0.916) 
Vitamin E       
N 2,096 2,842   317 411   317 411 
Mean 2.834 1.966 -0.868 0.367 0.323 -0.044 12.144 14.264 2.120 
SD (p-value) 0.429 0.399 (0.000) 0.152 0.129 (0.099) 3.999 3.360 (0.006) 












Citric Acid -0.045 -0.142 
(0.054) (0.000) 
Methionine -0.288 -0.323 
(0.000) (0.000) 
MCAA -0.311 -0.301 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Vitamin A -0.331 -0.272 
(0.030) (0.056) 
Vitamin B3 -0.308 -0.463 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Vitamin B4 -0.278 -0.223 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Vitamin E -0.797 -0.915 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, the sample includes data on eight years:  t-4 to t-1, and t+1 to t+4 (i.e. break-up 
year t is excluded).  SPOST refers to the short-run post-breakup period (years t+1 and t+2, for breakup year t).  LPOST refers 
to the long-run post-breakup period (years t+3 and t+4). All regressions include importer-exporter (trade-pair) fixed effects.  
Observations are weighted by trade quantity.  Robust (clustered by importer) p-values are in parentheses.   
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Table 5: Short run price changes controlling for pre-breakup effects  
  
Pre-breakup trend 
Short term post-breakup 
relative to short-term pre-
breakup  
  SPRE-LPRE SPOST-SPRE 
1 2 
 
Citric Acid 0.088 -0.075 
(0.000) (0.002) 
Methionine -0.064 -0.259 
(0.008) (0.000) 
MCAA -0.122 -0.254 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Vitamin A -0.364 -0.173 
(0.078) (0.448) 
Vitamin B3 -0.038 -0.291 
(0.553) (0.000) 
Vitamin B4 -0.054 -0.255 
(0.086) (0.000) 
Vitamin E -0.071 -0.766 
(0.012) (0.000) 
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on eight years:  t-4 to t-1, and t+1 to t+4 (i.e. break-up 
year t is excluded). SPOST refers to the short-run post-breakup period (years t+1 and t+2, for breakup year t).  SPRE refers to 
the short-run pre-breakup period (years t-2 and t-1). LPRE refers to the long-run pre-breakup period (years t-4 and t-3). 
SPOST-SPRE indicates difference in means between periods SPOST and SPRE.   All regressions include importer-exporter 
(trade-pair) fixed effects.  Observations are weighted by trade quantity.  Robust (clustered by importer) p-values are in 




Table 6:  Effect of cartel breakup on the relationship between distance and the propensity to 
trade 
Relative to 4-year  
pre-breakup period 
Relative to short-term  
pre-breakup period 
Short-run effect Long-run effect 
  SPOST-PRE LPOST-PRE SPOST-SPRE LPOST-SPRE 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 
    
Citric Acid -0.111 -0.159 -0.096 -0.144 
(0.015) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
Methionine 0.012 -0.007 0.009 -0.010 
(0.792) (0.868) (0.850) (0.820) 
MCAA -0.018 -0.055 -0.030 -0.067 
(0.658) (0.296) (0.508) (0.250) 
Vitamin A -0.007 0.012 -0.014 0.005 
(0.862) (0.811) (0.736) (0.930) 
Vitamin B3 -0.022 -0.021 -0.042 -0.041 
(0.573) (0.641) (0.296) (0.400) 
Vitamin B4 -0.049 -0.085 -0.051 -0.088 
(0.152) (0.047) (0.156) (0.040) 
Vitamin E -0.084 -0.017 -0.097 -0.030 
(0.042) (0.760) (0.024) (0.600) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the probit propensity estimation is a dummy = 1 if there is non-zero trade between 
a country pair. SPOST refers to the short-run post-breakup period (years t+1 and t+2, for breakup year t).  LPOST 
refers to the long-run post-breakup period (years t+3 and t+4). PRE refers to the 4-year pre-breakup period (years t-4 
to t-1).SPRE refers to the short-run pre-breakup period (years t-2 and t-1). SPOST-PRE indicates difference in means 
between periods SPOST and PRE.  All specifications include importer, exporter and year effects.  Other controls are 




Table 7:  Effect of cartel breakup on distance coefficient gravity equations  
Relative to 4-year  
pre-breakup period 
Relative to short-term  
pre-breakup period 
Short-run effect Long-run effect 
  SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_SPRE LPOST_SPRE 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 
  
Citric Acid 0.122 0.110 0.157 0.166 
(0.215) (0.378) (0.076) (0.130) 
Methionine -0.007 -0.008 0.016 -0.014 
(0.932) (0.920) (0.814) (0.860) 
MCAA -0.079 -0.023 0.093 0.473 
(0.553) (0.938) (0.501) (0.020) 
Vitamin A 0.024 -0.011 0.037 0.052 
(0.789) (0.905) (0.712) (0.560) 
Vitamin B3 0.101 0.003 0.161 0.062 
(0.302) (0.974) (0.127) (0.580) 
Vitamin B4 0.101 0.033 0.135 0.109 
(0.461) (0.875) (0.219) (0.380) 
Vitamin E 0.163 0.022 0.221 0.057 
(0.220) (0.775) (0.059) (0.430) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the gravity equation is log trade value.  SPOST refers to the short-run post-breakup 
period (years t+1 and t+2, for breakup year t).  LPOST refers to the long-run post-breakup period (years t+3 and t+4). 
PRE refers to the 4-year pre-breakup period (years t-4 to t-1).SPRE refers to the short-run pre-breakup period (years t-
2 and t-1). LPRE refers to the long-run pre-breakup period (years t-4 and t-3). SPOST-PRE indicates difference in 
means between periods SPOST and PRE.  Other column titles are similar. All regressions include importer, exporter 
and year effects.  These specifications also include correction for zero-trades based on Helpman et al (2008).  Other 




Table 8: Effect of cartel breakup on concentration measures 
  HHI Number of trade partners 
Relative to 4-year  
pre-breakup period 
Relative to short-term  
pre-breakup period Relative to 4-year  
pre-breakup period 








  SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_SPRE LPOST_SPRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_SPRE LPOST_SPRE 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
        
Citric Acid -0.011 0.009 -0.019 0.001 -0.325 -0.060 -0.632 -0.367 
(0.491) (0.655) (0.293) (0.970) (0.606) (0.936) (0.330) (0.640) 
Methionine -0.037 -0.032 -0.039 -0.034 0.498 0.541 0.818 0.863 
(0.173) (0.351) (0.116) (0.320) (0.271) (0.411) (0.096) (0.170) 
MCAA -0.003 0.000 0.020 0.024 0.270 0.217 -0.160 -0.215 
(0.863) (0.999) (0.224) (0.140) (0.631) (0.687) (0.670) (0.680) 
Vitamin A -0.037 -0.070 -0.038 -0.071 0.768 1.632 0.762 1.627 
(0.206) (0.046) (0.258) (0.050) (0.299) (0.007) (0.400) (0.020) 
Vitamin B3 -0.036 -0.022 -0.042 -0.029 1.725 0.438 1.639 0.350 
(0.107) (0.247) (0.047) (0.130) (0.009) (0.679) (0.007) (0.730) 
Vitamin B4 -0.005 -0.017 -0.005 -0.017 0.601 0.673 0.555 0.626 
(0.675) (0.730) (0.731) (0.750) (0.408) (0.199) (0.275) (0.030) 
Vitamin E -0.045 -0.054 -0.026 -0.036 1.863 2.309 1.243 1.697 
(0.050) (0.016) (0.328) (0.150) (0.002) (0.004) (0.073) (0.050) 
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on eight years:  t-4 to t-1, and t+1 to t+4 (i.e. break-up year t is excluded). SPOST refers to the 
short-run post-breakup period (years t+1 and t+2, for breakup year t).  LPOST refers to the long-run post-breakup period (years t+3 and t+4). PRE refers to the 4-
year pre-breakup period (years t-4 to t-1).SPRE refers to the short-run pre-breakup period (years t-2 and t-1). LPRE refers to the long-run pre-breakup period 
(years t-4 and t-3). SPOST-PRE indicates difference in means between periods SPOST and PRE.  Other column titles are similar. All regressions include importer 
fixed effects.  Observations are weighted by import quantity.  Robust (clustered by importer) p-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 9: Difference-in-differences estimates of effects on price, concentration and gravity distance 
coefficient  
  Control: Enzymes (excluding Rennet) Organic chemicals nes 
    Log price 
Herfindahl 
Index Gravity Log price 
Hefindahl 
Index Gravity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Citric Acid Short-run -0.002 -0.025 0.001 -0.215 0.02 0.033 
(0.978) (0.490) (0.958) (0.094) (0.604) (0.028) 
Long-run -0.075 0.012 0.010 -0.384 0.052 0.063 
(0.246) (0.642) (0.642) (0.002) (0.194) (0.001) 
Methionine Short-run -0.200 -0.028 0.007 -0.174 -0.01 0.031 
(0.000) (0.324) (0.699) (0.159) (0.800) (0.143) 
Long-run -0.298 -0.008 -0.021 -0.217 -0.013 0.155 
(0.000) (0.839) (0.908) (0.105) (0.796) (0.201) 
MCAA Short-run -0.222 0.006 0.038 -0.196 0.025 0.040 
(0.000) (0.804) (0.149) (0.114) (0.525) (0.290) 
Long-run -0.267 0.024 0.538 -0.185 0.021 0.42 
(0.000) (0.314) (0.000) (0.173) (0.629) (0.019) 
Vitamin A Short-run -0.245 -0.027 0.004 -0.244 -0.011 0.014 
(0.108) (0.406) (0.728) (0.175) (0.777) (0.408) 
Long-run -0.243 -0.045 0.199 -0.179 -0.053 0.089 
(0.087) (0.284) (0.000) (0.331) (0.297) (0.244) 
Vitamin B3 Short-run -0.263 -0.026 -0.009 -0.416 -0.007 -0.013 
(0.000) (0.338) (0.464) (0.000) (0.849) (0.411) 
Long-run -0.365 -0.012 -0.03 -0.334 0.014 -0.039 
(0.000) (0.613) (0.212) (0.034) (0.766) (0.257) 
Vitamin B4 Short-run -0.238 0.004 -0.095 -0.398 0.019 0.129 
(0.000) (0.829) (0.004) (0.000) (0.546) (0.007) 
Long-run -0.126 -0.006 -0.184 -0.104 0.019 0.274 
(0.034) (0.905) (0.003) (0.501) (0.765) (0.006) 
Vitamin E Short-run -0.709 -0.035 -0.028 -0.687 -0.018 -0.023 
(0.000) (0.174) (0.039) (0.000) (0.637) (0.212) 
Long-run -0.889 -0.029 0.165 -0.808 -0.036 0.032 
    (0.000) (0.394) (0.009) (0.000) (0.433) (0.783) 
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on eight years:  t-4 to t-1, and t+1 to t+4 (i.e. break-up 
year t is excluded). The corresponding years for the control product are also included.  The control product Enzymes 
(excluding Rennet) has HS code 350790, and Organic chemicals nes has HS code 294200.  The “short-run” is a dummy =1 for 
years t+1 and t+2 for the cartel product.  Similarly, the “long-run” is a dummy =1 for years t+3 and t+4 for the cartel product. 
The log price regressions in Columns 1 and 4 importer-exporter-product fixed effects and year effects, and are weighted by 
trade quantity.  The Herfindahl index regressions in Columns 2 and 5 include importer-product fixed effects and year effects 
and are weighted by total annual import quantity.  The gravity equation regressions in Columns 3 and 6 report coefficients 
on the short-run and long-run dummy interacted with distance and a cartel product dummy.  These specifications include 
exporter-product and importer-product fixed effects, as well as the year dummies interacted with distance.  Robust (clustered 





Table 10: Measures of extent of cross-hauling 
  
Import share of total 
trade for cartel home 
countries 
Import share from 
other cartel member 
home countries 
Mean HHI:  
Pre-breakup period 












border Other Diff 
Cartel 
border Other  Diff 
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 3c 4a 4b 4c 
      
Citric Acid 55.0% 53.5% 36.5% 29.4% 0.293 0.371 -0.078 0.277 0.324 -0.047 
    (.386) (.341) 
Methionine 25.4% 20.8% 27.2% 28.4% 0.324 0.454 -0.13 0.303 0.366 -0.063 
    (.026) (.147) 
MCAA 18.3% 16.4% 74.6% 72.7% 0.315 0.52 -0.205 0.365 0.502 -0.137 
    (.030) (.112) 
Vitamin A 22.1% 23.8% 91.0% 83.3% 0.404 0.34 0.064 0.371 0.327 0.044 
    (.587) (.477) 
Vitamin B3 60.0% 49.8% 22.2% 15.7% 0.551 0.359 0.192 0.429 0.332 0.097 
    (.098) (.248) 
Vitamin B4 38.6% 29.4% 71.1% 71.2% 0.234 0.463 -0.229 0.256 0.424 -0.168 
    (.037) (.055) 
Vitamin E 23.8% 29.7% 76.4% 56.5% 0.325 0.358 -0.033 0.333 0.302 0.031 
              (.648)     (.569) 






Figure 1: Price changes following cartel breakup  
 
Notes: This figure plots the mean log price (controlling for bilateral fixed effects, weighted by trade quantity using regression specification 5c in the text) before 
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Figure 4: Change (relative to breakup year -5) in the distance coefficient in a probit (propensity to trade) equation 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the probit regression is a dummy =1 if there is non-zero trade between a country pair.  All regressions include exporter, importer 






































































































Figure 5: Change (relative to breakup year -5) in the distance coefficient in a gravity equation 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the gravity equation is log trade value.  All regressions include exporter, importer fixed effects and year effects, and include 
correction for zero-trade based on Helpman et al (2008).  Other controls are discussed in the text and data appendix.  Confidence intervals use robust (clustered by 
































































































Figure 6: HHI Trends 
 
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on nine years:  t-4 to t+4. All regressions include importer fixed effects.  The importer-year 


























































































D1. Definitions for key variables 
1. Trade value: total trade value in nominal US dollars. 
2. Trade quantity: total trade quantity (in reported units). 
3. Price:  ratio of trade value to trade quantity, truncated by 2% on both tails of the distribution.44 
4. Distance:  Log bilateral population weighted distance (in km). 
5. Number of trade partners: Njkt is the number of countries exporting product k to country j in period t. 
6. Import market share: Sijkt is the market share of export country i in the total value of imports of product k entering country j in period t. 
7. Export market share: Xijkt is the share of the exports going to country j in the total value of exports of product k by exporter country I in period t. 











9. Absolute share instability: sum of the absolute value of changes in shares between year t and year t-1 (with index k suppressed):45 
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10. Relative share instability: sum of the absolute value of changes in shares between year t and year t-1 divided by the mean shares in period t and 
t-1.  Again suppressing product index k  
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D2. Definitions for control variables used in the trade dummy probit and gravity regressions: 
The control variables used follow Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).  Data were obtained from multiple sources including: Centre d'Etudes 
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII), at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm; the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2007; Andrew Rose’s website, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#Software.  
 
1. Common border:  binary variable equal to one if importer i and exporter j share a common physical boundary, and zero otherwise. 
2. Island: binary variable equal to one if both importer i and exporter j are islands, and zero otherwise. 
3. Landlocked: binary variable equal to one if neither exporting country j nor importing country i have a coastline or direct access to sea, and zero 
otherwise. 
4. Colonial ties: binary variable equal to one if importing country i ever colonized exporting country j or vice versa, and zero otherwise. 
5. Common colony: dummy variable indicating whether the two countries had a common colonizer post-1945. 
6. Currency union: binary variable equal to one if importing country i and exporting country j use same currency or if the exchange rate between 
the pair was fixed at 1:1 for an extended period of time (see Rose (2000, 2004) and Glick and Rose (2002)), and zero otherwise. 
                                                     
44 As described in the data section, quantity and value are set to missing for the top and bottom 2% of the price distribution, so that all subsequent 
analysis involving these variables exclude these observations. 




7. Legal system: binary variable equal to one if importing country i and exporting country j share the same legal origin, and zero otherwise. 
8. RTA: binary variable equal to one if exporting country j and importing country i belong to a regional trade agreement, and zero otherwise. 
9. NON-WTO:  binary variable equal to one if neither exporting country j nor importing country i belong to the GATT/WTO, and zero 
otherwise.46  
10. WTO: binary variable equal to one if both countries belong to the GATT/WTO, and zero otherwise. 
11. GDP: log of the product of GDP of importer and exporter countries measured in constant 2000 US dollars  
12. GDPPC: log of the product of per capita GDP of the importer and exporter countries measured in constant 2000 US dollars  
13. Common Language: dummy variable indicating that a single language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both countries. 
14. Area: log product of the areas of importer and exporter. 
 
Excluded variables (i.e included in the 1st stage probit regressions but excluded from the 2nd stage gravity regressions): 
 
15. Entry days: binary indicator equal to one if the sum of the number of days and procedures to form a business is above the median for both the 
importing country i and exporting country j,. 
16. Entry costs: binary indicator equal to one if the relative cost (as percent of GDP per capita) of forming a business is above the median in the 
exporting country j and the importing country i, and zero otherwise. 
17. Religion: (% Protestants in country i * % Protestants in country j) + (% Catholics in country i * % Catholics in country j) + (% Muslims in 
country i * % Muslims in country j). 
D3. Standardized country definitions for those that merged or divided during sample period 
Region Classified as  Comment 
Belgium-Luxembourg Belgium Post-1998, data are from Belgium only. Since Luxembourg is small and we have no reported 
trade for Luxembourg post-1998, we reclassify Belgium-Luxembourg as Belgium. 
Fmr Dem. Rep. of 
Germany 




FRG and DRG are reported separately pre-1991.  Post-1991 data are aggregated.  We aggregate 





Pre-1992 data are reported as Czechoslovakia. We consolidate post-1992 Slovakia and Czech 





We aggregate post-2004 data for consistency. 
 
                                                     
46 For all cartels except Vitamin B4, a 1 on the non-WTO dummy perfectly predicts failure to trade and therefore this variable is dropped from the 
analysis.  
 
Appendix: Additional Results 
Table A.1: Log price robustness checks 
  Log FOB Price 
Log Price (imports from 
Cartel HQs only)   
  SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 
    
Citric Acid 0.022 -0.068 -0.078 -0.135
(0.282) (0.005) (0.030) (0.000)
Methionine -0.319 -0.324 -0.292 -0.325
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MCAA -0.288 -0.298 -0.327 -0.309
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vitamin A -0.377 -0.395 -0.353 -0.284
(0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.066)
Vitamin B3 -0.287 -0.442 -0.303 -0.546
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vitamin B4 -0.278 -0.251 -0.299 -0.24
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vitamin E -0.671 -0.821 -0.785 -0.871
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on eight years:  t-4 to t-1, and t+1 to t+4 (i.e. break-up year t is excluded). All 
regressions include importer-exporter (trade-pair) fixed effects.  Observations are weighted by trade quantity.  In Columns 1a and 1b, the sample 
uses reported export values and quantities to define price.  In columns 2a and 2b, only imports from cartel headquarter countries are included in 
the sample. Robust (clustered by importer) p-values are in parentheses.   
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Table A.2: Robustness of effect of competition on the distance coefficient in gravity equations: Alternative specifications 
  
OLS+ Trade-pair  




(OLS + trade-pair fixed 
effects) 
Export share 


















  SPOST_SPRE LPOST_SPRE SPOST_SPRE SPOST_SPRE LPOST_SPRE LPOST_SPRE SPOST_SPRE LPOST_SPRE 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
      
Citric Acid -0.045 -0.039 -0.061 0.005 -0.103 -0.038 0.022 0.073 
(0.396) (0.541) (0.296) (0.941) (0.007) (0.489) (0.880) (0.073) 
Methionine 0.141 0.099 0.106 0.083 0.039 0.113 0.133 0.119 
(0.047) (0.225) (0.105) (0.250) (0.477) (0.300) (0.175) (0.119) 
MCAA 0.046 0.224 0.041 0.121 0.037 0.091 0.065 0.161 
(0.646) (0.073) (0.453) (0.158) (0.428) (0.199) (0.509) (0.161) 
Vitamin A 0.106 0.168 0.042 0.02 0.149 0.272 0.156 0.234 
(0.162) (0.050) (0.485) (0.819) (0.064) (0.066) (0.242) (0.234) 
Vitamin B3 0.061 0.132 0.161 0.257 0.05 0.192 0.251 0.345 
(0.455) (0.103) (0.005) (0.011) (0.419) (0.060) (0.038) (0.345) 
Vitamin B4 0.095 0.059 0.284 0.264 0.09 0.067 0.264 0.299 
(0.291) (0.614) (0.013) (0.010) (0.391) (0.528) (0.251) (0.299) 
Vitamin E 0.074 0.059 0.032 0.075 0.094 0.17 0.161 0.352 
(0.326) (0.481) (0.552) (0.379) (0.085) (0.057) (0.069) (0.352) 
Notes: All estimated effects are relative to the 4-year pre-breakup period (t-1 to t-4). The dependent variable is log trade value in Columns 1a and 1b, trade value in 
Columns 2a and 2b, import share (quantity) in column 3a and 3b and export share (quantity) in columns 4a and 4b.  Import and export share regressions are 
weighted by total annual import and export quantity respectively.  All columns include importer-exporter and year effects. Other controls are discussed in the text 
and data appendix.   Robust (clustered by importer) p-values are in parentheses.   
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Table A.3: Robustness of effect of competition on the distance coefficient in gravity equations: Alternative sub-samples 
Baseline  Europe only Balanced panel 
Imports from Cartel HQs 
only 
  SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE  SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE 
  1a 1b 3b 3b 3a 3b  4a 4b 
          
Citric Acid 0.122 0.110 -0.297 -0.318 0.117 0.100 -0.034 -0.104
(0.215) (0.378) (0.201) (0.203) (0.224) (0.401)  (0.932)  (0.920)
Methionine -0.007 -0.008 -0.13 -0.065 -0.076 -0.164 4.892 1.587
(0.932) (0.920) (0.374) (0.716) (0.565) (0.232)  (0.033)  (0.132)
MCAA -0.079 -0.023 -0.361 0.145 0.008 0.234 1.874 1.227
(0.553) (0.938) (0.082) (0.689) (0.952) (0.286)  (0.240)  (0.553)
Vitamin A 0.024 -0.011 0.135 0.064 -0.044 -0.112 1.812 -0.912
(0.789) (0.905) (0.628) (0.885) (0.625) (0.329)  (0.287)  (0.200)
Vitamin B3 0.101 0.003 0.125 0.181 0.101 -0.004 0.154 1.065
(0.302) (0.974) (0.454) (0.433) (0.301) (0.970)  (0.692)  (0.069)
Vitamin B4 0.101 0.033 -0.044 -0.059 0.138 0.147 -0.193 -0.945
(0.461) (0.875) (0.790) (0.827) (0.183) (0.300)  (0.702)  (0.554)
Vitamin E 0.163 0.022 -0.075 0.041 0.124 -0.031 -1.464 0.176
(0.220) (0.775) (0.745) (0.814) (0.236) (0.701)  (0.001)  (0.721)
Notes: The dependent variable in the gravity equation is log trade value.  All effects are relative to 4-year pre-cartel breakup period.  The probit and gravity 
regressions include importer, exporter and year effects.  Gravity equations also include correction for zero-trades based on Helpman et al (2008).  Other controls 
are discussed in the text and data appendix.   Robust (clustered by importer) p-values are in parentheses.   
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Table A.4: Robustness of concentration results: Alternative concentration measures and changes in market share instability  
C2 ratio (imports) HHI (exports) Absolute share instability 
Relative  
share instability 
SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
          
Citric Acid -0.006 0.026 -0.066 -0.054 -0.031 -0.020 2.157 3.321 
(0.169) (0.169) (0.005) (0.108) (0.383) (0.692) (0.375) (0.100) 
Methionine -0.025 -0.009 -0.011 -0.018 -0.064 0.002 -0.002 -0.065 
(0.763) (0.763) (0.503) (0.301) (0.153) (0.979) (0.999) (0.957) 
MCAA 0.015 0.009 0.000 -0.019 0.095 0.058 0.978 -0.276 
(0.496) (0.496) (0.973) (0.186) (0.091) (0.156) (0.299) (0.794) 
Vitamin A -0.029 -0.053 -0.026 -0.046 0.032 0.081 0.466 0.948 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.041) (0.000) (0.402) (0.150) (0.692) (0.413) 
Vitamin B3 -0.032 -0.011 -0.012 -0.025 0.079 -0.040 2.745 2.772 
(0.609) (0.609) (0.610) (0.361) (0.529) (0.420) (0.012) (0.020) 
Vitamin B4 -0.007 -0.006 -0.098 -0.117 0.090 0.112 2.306 2.210 
(0.798) (0.798) (0.222) (0.002) (0.013) (0.370) (0.108) (0.073) 
Vitamin E -0.063 -0.067 -0.02 0.001 0.058 0.049 2.393 0.039 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.060) (0.952) (0.221) (0.288) (0.041) (0.988) 
Notes: All effects are relative to 4-year pre-cartel breakup period.  For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on eight years:  t-4 
to t-1, and t+1 to t+4 (i.e. break-up year t is excluded). Columns 1, 3 and 4 include importer fixed effects, and Column 2 includes exporter fixed 
effects.  Observations are weighted by trade quantity.  Robust (clustered by importer in Columns 1, 3 and 4 and exporter in Column 2) p-values 
are in parentheses.   
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Table A.5: Robustness of concentration (HHI) results: Alternative subsamples 
 Europe only Balanced panel 
Excluding cartel home 
countries 
Imports from Cartel HQs 
only: 
  SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE SPOST_PRE LPOST_PRE 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
        
Citric Acid -0.012 0.002 -0.011 0.009 -0.009 0.010 -0.008 0.030 
(0.463) (0.921) (0.491) (0.655) (0.686) (0.648) (0.646) (0.128) 
Methionine -0.010 -0.021 -0.037 -0.032 -0.037 -0.029 -0.019 0.002 
(0.528) (0.334) (0.172) (0.350) (0.262) (0.474) (0.486) (0.946) 
MCAA -0.004 0.027 -0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.014 0.034 0.040 
(0.892) (0.159) (0.863) (0.999) (0.624) (0.405) (0.103) (0.118) 
Vitamin A -0.022 -0.067 -0.037 -0.070 -0.036 -0.055 -0.017 -0.039 
(0.051) (0.270) (0.206) (0.046) (0.311) (0.102) (0.483) (0.392) 
Vitamin B3 -0.025 -0.003 -0.036 -0.022 -0.051 -0.032 0.099 0.088 
(0.530) (0.919) (0.106) (0.246) (0.005) (0.103) (0.006) (0.032) 
Vitamin B4 -0.010 -0.105 -0.005 -0.017 0.006 -0.039 -0.040 -0.066 
(0.587) (0.128) (0.674) (0.729) (0.731) (0.504) (0.098) (0.107) 
Vitamin E -0.040 -0.014 -0.045 -0.054 -0.049 -0.063 -0.010 -0.019 
  -(0.003) -(0.604) (0.050) (0.016) (0.082) (0.018) (0.764) (0.603) 
Notes: The dependent variable is importer country HHI.   Robust (clustered by importer) p-values are in parentheses. 
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Table A.6: Summary statistics on trade dummy and trade values 
   Non-zero trade dummy Log trade value 
  Pre-breakup Post-breakup Pre-breakup Post-breakup 
 
Citric Acid N 54,405 72,540 1,662 3,618 
 Mean 0.031 0.050 11.149 10.735 
 SD (p-value) 0.172 0.218 2.282 2.354 
 
Methionine N 40,572 54,096 1,432 2,333 
 Mean 0.035 0.043 12.165 11.748 
 SD (p-value) 0.185 0.203 2.300 2.522 
 
MCAA N 28,860 38,480 914 1,336 
 Mean 0.032 0.035 10.612 9.922 
 SD (p-value) 0.175 0.183 2.526 2.862 
 
Vitamin A N 46,656 62,208 1,487 2,516 
 Mean 0.032 0.040 11.056 10.454 
 SD (p-value) 0.176 0.197 2.412 2.588 
 
Vitamin B3 N 28,203 37,604 1,280 2,128 
 Mean 0.045 0.057 10.876 10.381 
 SD (p-value) 0.208 0.231 2.319 2.485 
 
Vitamin B4 N 39,744 52,992 1,321 1,997 
 Mean 0.033 0.038 10.549 10.139 
 SD (p-value) 0.179 0.190 1.915 2.143 
 
Vitamin E N 42,840 57,120 1,617 2,788 
 Mean 0.038 0.049 11.406 10.682 
 SD (p-value) 0.191 0.215 2.673 2.660 
Notes: All means are un-weighted.  p-values are in parenthesis. 
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Comparisons of price changes in different time periods: 
 
In this appendix sub-section we discuss results from specification 8b in more detail (See Appendix Table A.7 below).   
While results in Column 5 indicate some prior declining trend, comparing column 1 to Column 5 in Appendix Table A.7, in 
almost all cases (except Vitamin A) there appears to have been larger and more significant decline in prices following the cartel 
breakup (compared to the prior trend), consistent with a significant increase in competitive intensity. 
One concern in the context of cartel breakups is whether prices rebound up (say because the cartel informally/tacitly start 
colluding again).  We find greater decline in the long-run (Column 2) relative to the short run (Column 1).  This is confirmed by the 
statistical test of the difference between the short-run and long-run post-breakup periods (i.e.  LPOST SPOSTα α− ) in Column 6, where in 
most cases we find a statistically significant further decline.  The only case with a statistically significant rebound is Vitamin B4, but 
the rebound is small relative to the initial decline (0.056 log points relative to -0.255 log points). 
Consistent with the results on prior trends (column 5 discussed above), the declines are generally larger in magnitude when 
we compare post-breakup prices to the long-run pre-breakup period (years t-4 and t-3) in columns 3 and 4.  
To re-confirm that there were indeed significant price declines (even relative to prior trends) for all seven cartels, we examine 
a richer picture of year to year variations in price effects, by plotting coefficients on period dummies from the following specification:  
4
4s
ijt s S ij ijtp D fα
+
=−
= + +∑ ε         (8c) 
where s is an index variable for the number of years from breakup and is defined as [year - breakup year], ranging from -4 to +4.  Ds 
is a dummy variable corresponding to the index (e.g., D2=1 if s=2, and 0 otherwise).   
The estimated coefficients and corresponding confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 3. The figures confirm the results from Tables 
4 and 5:  all seven cartels show strong declines in price in the post-period relative to the pre-period.  Almost all cartels show a sharp 
decline either in the breakup year or in the year following the breakup.   Consistent with Table 4 and 5 results, Citric Acid shows a 
run-up in price before the breakup, and Vitamin B4 shows a significant rebound.  Methionine and MCAA show some rebound too, 
but other cartels (except Vitamin A) show further declines. 
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Table A.7: Log price changes – detailed breakup of pre- and post-breakup effects (Columns 1 and 5 are in table 5 in the paper) 
  
Relative to short-term pre-
breakup period 







effect Short-run effect Long-run effect 
  SPOST-SPRE LPOST-SPRE SPOST-LPRE LPOST-LPRE SPRE-LPRE LPOST-SPOST 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Citric Acid -0.075 -0.172 0.013 -0.084 0.088 -0.097 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.641) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Methionine -0.259 -0.294 -0.323 -0.358 -0.064 -0.035 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.009) 
MCAA -0.254 -0.244 -0.376 -0.366 -0.122 0.010 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.685) 
Vitamin A -0.173 -0.113 -0.537 -0.477 -0.364 0.060 
(0.448) (0.600) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.536) 
Vitamin B3 -0.291 -0.447 -0.329 -0.485 -0.038 -0.156 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.553) (0.000) 
Vitamin B4 -0.255 -0.199 -0.309 -0.253 -0.054 0.056 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.029) 
Vitamin E -0.766 -0.884 -0.837 -0.955 -0.071 -0.118 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.009) 
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on eight years:  t-4 to t-1, and t+1 to t+4 (i.e. break-up year t is excluded). SPOST refers to the 
short-run post-breakup period (years t+1 and t+2, for breakup year t).  LPOST refers to the long-run post-breakup period (years t+3 and t+4). SPRE refers to the 
short-run pre-breakup period (years t-2 and t-1). LPRE refers to the long-run pre-breakup period (years t-4 and t-3). SPOST-SPRE indicates difference in means 
between periods SPOST and SPRE.  Other column titles are similar.  All regressions include importer-exporter (trade-pair) fixed effects.  Observations are 
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Figure A.1: Log price trends  
 
Notes: For each cartel that breaks up in year t, sample includes data on nine years:  t-4 to t+4. All regressions include importer-exporter (trade-pair) fixed effects.  
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